‎Discussion

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This quadratic cost is the only one under which citizens have in theory an incentive to and in experiments in practice do vote in proportion to how important issues are to them. It is thus the only rule that leads to social decisions that produce the greatest good for the greatest number. By making collective institutions that are thus truly responsive to the general interest and not just the prejudices of the majority or special interest, QV could restore faith in and thus a greater role for public institutions. Political minorities could protect their most cherished interests at the ballot box without relying on whims of judges and compromises on sensitive issue could be hammered out transparently in the public square. The public sector, and organizations of all sorts governed by voting (from corporations to housing co-ops), could make decisions efficient in the best total interests of their stakeholders."
 
This quadratic cost is the only one under which citizens have in theory an incentive to and in experiments in practice do vote in proportion to how important issues are to them. It is thus the only rule that leads to social decisions that produce the greatest good for the greatest number. By making collective institutions that are thus truly responsive to the general interest and not just the prejudices of the majority or special interest, QV could restore faith in and thus a greater role for public institutions. Political minorities could protect their most cherished interests at the ballot box without relying on whims of judges and compromises on sensitive issue could be hammered out transparently in the public square. The public sector, and organizations of all sorts governed by voting (from corporations to housing co-ops), could make decisions efficient in the best total interests of their stakeholders."
 
(https://medium.com/@julien.carbonnell/civil-society-futures-of-citizenship-and-democracy-through-digital-era-24e28c27276)
 
(https://medium.com/@julien.carbonnell/civil-society-futures-of-citizenship-and-democracy-through-digital-era-24e28c27276)
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=Review=
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Dick Bryan and Akseli Virtanen:
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"Associated with, and developing out of, a broadly Hayekian tradition are those who see that the integrity of market processes have been corrupted in various ways, and not simply by ‘the state’. Here, the outcomes of neoliberalism — extreme inequality, monopoly power, environmental destruction — are forcefully criticised, but not in the name of a critique of capitalism; rather in the name of obstacles to free expression in markets. Eric Posner and Glen Weyl’s Radical Markets is a recent case in point, and has acquired significant support from people involved in cryptoecnomics. They contend that the problems of the current era are about the specification of property rights, not capitalist markets per se. In particular, private property of all kinds, they argue, constitutes monopoly ownership and hence the propensity to monopoly pricing. Their alternative is to constitute economic relations via processes of auctions, designed so that people will reveal their ‘true’ interests. There is no higher notion of the social good than what can be revealed by efficient auction design; and especially the utilisation of prediction markets to elicit preferences.
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Posner and Weyl don’t use the language of derivatives, but what they are effectively doing is to build call options into the pricing of property, with the aim to bring back ethical virtue and efficiency to market processes. We note this derivative dimension and will return to it later. Blockchain’s smart contracts — themselves derivative positions — articulate with this vision.
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The analysis of Posner and Weyl is extolled by Vitalik Buterin, head of the Ethereum project, who summarises their book’s agenda precisely:
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- "The general philosophy of the book, as I interpret it, can be expressed as follows. Markets are great, and price mechanisms are an awesome way of guiding the use of resources in society and bringing together many participants’ objectives and information into a coherent whole. However, markets are socially constructed because they depend on property rights that are socially constructed, and there are many different ways that markets and property rights can be constructed, some of which are unexplored and potentially far better than what we have today. Contra doctrinaire libertarians, freedom is a high-dimensional design space."
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We can embrace this depiction as stated, while not also embracing some controversial views of Posner and Weyl (for example their rejection of a doctrine of human rights as an imposition on market freedoms; their idealisation of mid 19th century liberalism)."
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(https://medium.com/econaut/crypto-political-economy-dd91c6fcff7)
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=Discussion=
 
=Discussion=
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With all the talk surrounding radical markets and liberal radicalism, plus the development of a subcommunity of crypto enthusiasts interested in the research, it makes sense for an organized movement to materialize. Thus emerges RadicalxChange."
 
With all the talk surrounding radical markets and liberal radicalism, plus the development of a subcommunity of crypto enthusiasts interested in the research, it makes sense for an organized movement to materialize. Thus emerges RadicalxChange."
 
(https://www.ethnews.com/lets-get-radical-glen-weyl-radicalxchange-and-blockchain-technology)
 
(https://www.ethnews.com/lets-get-radical-glen-weyl-radicalxchange-and-blockchain-technology)
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==Radical Markets and [[Ethereum]]==
 
==Radical Markets and [[Ethereum]]==
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The founding of municipal projects and public works, make the city a fertile site for application of Liberal Radicalism, too, and these applications are among the most promising in terms of feasibility of self-funding. Even though they are democratic systems intented to represent the will of a constituency, the needs of very small groups cannot be heard. Some public goods are intensely important to a select few and the systems in place for communicating those needs and receiving the adequate funding are highly inefficient. [[Liberal Radicalism]], as applied to urban public funding decisions, could allow communities at all scales to fund projects that would struggle to get funding under centralized systems. Community-level decision-making in urban planning only will confer economic development on the city the kind of diversity it needs."
 
The founding of municipal projects and public works, make the city a fertile site for application of Liberal Radicalism, too, and these applications are among the most promising in terms of feasibility of self-funding. Even though they are democratic systems intented to represent the will of a constituency, the needs of very small groups cannot be heard. Some public goods are intensely important to a select few and the systems in place for communicating those needs and receiving the adequate funding are highly inefficient. [[Liberal Radicalism]], as applied to urban public funding decisions, could allow communities at all scales to fund projects that would struggle to get funding under centralized systems. Community-level decision-making in urban planning only will confer economic development on the city the kind of diversity it needs."
 
(https://medium.com/@julien.carbonnell/civil-society-futures-of-citizenship-and-democracy-through-digital-era-24e28c27276)
 
(https://medium.com/@julien.carbonnell/civil-society-futures-of-citizenship-and-democracy-through-digital-era-24e28c27276)
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==An alternative vision proposed by ECSA==
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Dick Bryan and Akseli Virtanen:
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"What remains contested, and where ECSA has focussed, is the question of what we mean by ‘markets’ and their relations with ‘society’. Markets may be ‘great’, to use Vitalik’s term, but as they currently operate, they are fundamentally directed to serving the pursuit of individual profits. In the discourse of Posner and Weyl they can be directed to socially ‘fair’ (non-monopoly) profits; but individual profits nonetheless.
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ECSA has designed markets so as to pursue goals other than individual profit-making: what is valued does not need to be connected to capitalist-defined profitability. Financially-framed options can be designed so as to reveal social value, but in a way differently from how they are embedded in Radical Markets.
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In the hands of Posner and Weyl, well-designed markets move toward equilibrium (balance) and the collective good follows. ECSA disagrees: markets are innately volatile (as the older Hayek concurred) and any design of a cryptoeconomy must embrace volatility; not wish it away. Instead, ECSA sees potential in a cryptoeconomy to use tokens not merely as a means of exchange for optimal trading processes, but also as a unit of account: a mode of measuring; a mode of valuing, and a way of choosing which sorts of volatility to embrace and which to neutralize.
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This opens up an entirely different, and more expansive — and more political — design space. It opens the possibility that things currently deemed desirable but unprofitable — for example care, art, research, affect, biosphere enhancement — can come to prominence as value-creating activities. They need not be seen as after-thoughts, to be ‘subsidised’ by the state because they are virtuous-but-unprofitable. In summary, if we measure differently, these value-creating activities can best be depicted as themselves producing a ‘surplus’ (a term we prefer to ‘profit’): they create more value in their output than they use in their inputs. But to do this we have to value both inputs and outputs in different ways."
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(https://medium.com/econaut/crypto-political-economy-dd91c6fcff7)
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[[Category:Books]]
 
[[Category:Books]]

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